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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court declined to discuss
the substantive merits of the plaintiffs case in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife for lack of standing,' deciding that the Defenders of
Wildlife failed to make an appropriate showing to bring a claim
* Erick D. Rigby is a partner in the law firm of CamsonRigby, LLC. He has a J.D.
from the University of Akron School of Law and a Masters of Applied Politics from the Bliss
Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron. Special thanks to Rose A. Semple,
Esq., Randall G. Shelley, Jr., Esq., and Prof. Jane C. Moriarty for their help with this arti-
cle.
1. 504 U.S. 555, 578(1992) (plurality opinion), rev'g 911 F.2d 117, 118 (8th Cir. 1990).
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under § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").2 As indi-
cated by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence, a future plaintiff
may be able to make the appropriate showing regarding standing,
and the court could then determine the appropriate application of
§ 7(a)(2).3 Since that time, the question of the application of §
7(a)(2) to extraterritorial projects remains unsettled and academ-
ics have debated Lujan from various angles.4 Some scholars have
discussed the significant procedural limitations that the decision
has placed on environmental actions regardless of the statute the
plaintiff intends to enforce.5 Others have focused on the legality of
the substantive issue from which Lujan arose.6
This article will broaden the discussion regarding the substan-
tive application of § 7(a)(2) by juxtaposing the habeas corpus liti-
gation of Rasul v. Bush7 with the extraterritorial application of §
7(a)(2).' The Court in Rasul found that the United States District
Courts had jurisdiction to hear the habeas appeals of foreign na-
2. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569, 578. The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, en-
compasses Parts I, II, III-A, and IV and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Id. at 557, 579, 581. Scalia authored the plurality
opinion, Part III-B, joined by Rehnquist, White, and Thomas. Id. at 558 (plurality opinion).
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only and wrote a separate concurring opinion.
Id. at 581 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Conner dissented. Id.
at 589 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Section 7(a)(2) requires Federal agencies to consult with
the Secretary of the Interior to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency.. . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existences of any endangered spe-
cies or threatened species or result in destruction or adverse modification of a listed specie's
critical habitat." Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
For a discussion of standing, see infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
3. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Ken-
nedy stated in his concurrence that:
[lit may seem trivial to require that [Plaintiffs] acquire airline tickets to the project
sites or announce a date certain upon which they will return ... [T]his is not a case
where it is reasonable to assume that the affiants will be using the sites on a regular
basis.
Id. Justice Kennedy went on to point out that the plaintiffs have not visited the site in
question since the project began. Id.
4. See generally George Cameron Coggins & John W. Head, Beyond Defenders: Future
Problems of Extraterritoriality and Superterritoriality for the Endangered Species Act, 43
WASH.U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 59 (1993) (discussing the potential issues arising from
extraterritorial application of the Endangered Species Act); Stanley E. Rice, Standing on
Shaky Ground: The Supreme Court Curbs Standing for Environmental Plaintiffs in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife,38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 199 (1993) (discussing the standing issues
raised by Lujan).
5. Rice, supra note 4. Rice discussed the underlying principles of separation of pow-
ers, which necessitate proper standing. Id. at 201-03. With regard to environmental stat-
utes that allow for citizens to file suit in order to enforce the statute, this creates significant
problems because meeting the specific criteria of standing becomes difficult. Id. at 200.
6. See, e.g., Coggins & Head, supra note 4.
7. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
8. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
Endangered Species Act
tionals being detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because the
habeas writ is directed at the jailer, not the detainee.9 Under that
reasoning, § 7(a)(2) would apply to any agency projects, because
the requirements of the section are directed at United States fed-
eral agencies taking action that originates in the United States.
This article will argue that this aspect of the Rasul decision adds
significant weight to the argument that the presumption against
extraterritorial application of American statutes (the "Presump-
tion") is inapplicable with regard to § 7(a)(2).
The importance of maintaining a broad reach for the ESA is
overwhelming, considering the interrelated nature of Earth's eco-
systems and the impact that changes to those ecosystems can have
on human life.' ° The United States took an important step in pro-
tecting its own population, as well as benefiting the rest of the
world, when Congress passed the ESA." However, the threat of
mass extinction has not been halted. 2 Additional measures un-
doubtedly are needed, 3 and allowing the ESA to reach its full po-
tential would be a significant step in the protection of not only
14listed species, but also human life and the global economy.
9. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480, 483-84 ("No party questions the District Court's jurisdiction
over petitioners' custodians.").
10. See generally Eric Chivian & Aaron S. Bernstein, Embedded in Nature: Human
Health and Biodiversity, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. A-12 (2004), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1241805/pdf/ehp0ll2-a00012.pdf (discussing
the impact of diminishing biodiversity on bio-medical research and development); Robert
Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387
NATURE 253 (1997), available at
http://www.coralreef.gov/mitigation/costanza-et-al-nature_1997.pdf (estimating the eco-
nomic value of ecosystems and their benefits to human existence); David Pimentel et al.,
Economic and Environmental Benefits of Biodiversity:The Annual Economic and Environ-
mental Benefits of Biodiversity in the United States Total Approximately $300 Billion, 47
BIOSCIENCE 747 (Dec. 1997); Kevin Parris, Sustainable Agriculture Depends on Biodiver-
sity, OECD OBSERVER, Aug. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/755 (discussing the impact of biodiver-
sity on modern agriculture).
11. The ESA is structured in order to protect species from extinction and to maintain
biodiversity. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. For further discussion of the protection the ESA
provides, see infra note 29. Biodiversity is important to a number of aspects of human life.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
12. Evolution Library: The Current Mass Extinction,
PBS.ORG,http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/evolution/library/03/2/1 032 04.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2012). Historically, the base level of species' extinction is approximately one to ten
species per year or one species per million per year. Id. Currently, the Earth is losing
approximately "27,000 species per year to extinction." Id. This number is difficult to esti-
mate due to the inclusion of species such as insects, bacteria, and fungi. Id.
13. See id.
14. See Pimentel, supra note 10 (discussing the environmental and economic impact of
sustained biodiversity).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Endangered Species Act
While the ESA itself is nearly forty years old, its historical de-
velopment stretches deeply into the past.15 The ESA has gone
through different stages and legislative actions since its enact-
ment.16  The Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966
("ESPA") preceded the ESA. 7 Although a positive step in the di-
rection of conservation, the ESPA had little coercive power.18 The
passage of the ESA added teeth to the legal protection of ecosys-
tems.'9
Congress codified the ESA into the United States Code in order
to implement two conservation treaties to which the United States
is a signatory.'0 The statute replaced an expanded version of the
15. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Endangered Species Act: Lessons Over 30 Years, and the Leg-
acy of the Snail Darter, a Small Fish in a Pork Barrel, 34 ENVTL. L. 289, 291 (2004). The
Endangered Species "Act is a descendant of centuries of philosophical and cultural recogni-
tions about the role of human society in the context of the natural world." Id. The underly-
ing principles of the act can be traced back as far as the "public trust principles in the era of
Emperor Justinian and even earlier." Id. (citing JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY
FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS 7-8 (1974)). "'When hu-
mans interfere with the Tao, the sky becomes filthy, the equilibrium crumbles, creatures
become extinct.'" Id. at 291 n.8 (quoting LAO-TZU, TAO TECHING (c. 500 B.C.E.)).
16. See BRIAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HISTORY,
CONSERVATION, BIOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 21-24 (2001). Amendments to the Endan-
gered Species Act have been passed in 1978, 1979, 1982, and 1988. Endangered Species
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1544 (2006)).
17. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926; see
also Leona K Svancara et al., Endangered Species Time Line, in 2 THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY 25 (J. Michael Scott et al. eds., 2006), available at
http://www.law.uidaho.edu/default.aspx?pid=112338. Through the last fifty years there
have been a number of significant milestones in the protection of endangered species using
legal means. See id. at passim. While these are predominately federal measures, there
have been attempts by individual states to aid in the protection of endangered species as
well; for example, Nevada enacted species protection measures in 1969, which gave legal
protections to endangered creatures. Id. at 26.
18. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966.The ESPA became the first piece of
legislation at the federal level aimed at protecting endangered species. See id. at 24-25.
Similar to the ESA, the ESPA allowed for the listing of endangered species. Id. at 25.
Further, it allowed for the "acquisition of endangered species habitat for inclusion in the
newly established National Wildlife Refuge System." Id.
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (including criminal and civil penalties for failure to comply
with the ESA).The ESA began humbly, but it quickly became a politically charged issue.
See Plater, supra note 15, at 292.
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544; Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service: Endangered Species Act of 1973, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/ESACT.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). Those trea-
ties are:
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ESPA, the Endangered Species Conservation Act ("ESCA), 21 and
has been amended several times since its enactment on December
28, 1973.22 Congress intended the ESA to "provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved ... ."' To achieve
[T]he Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora art. II, Mar. 3, 1973, 27.2 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (regulating the trade
of species that are either "threatened with extinction... or may be affected by trade")
and (T.I.A.S. 8249), signed by the United States on March 3, 1973, and the Conven-
tion on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Oct.
12, 1940, 50 Stat. 1354, 161 U.N.T.S. 193 (relating to the selection and protection of
certain animal reserves such as national parks), signed by the United States on Oc-
tober 12, 1940.
Id. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora intends to regulate the trade of species that are either "threatened with extinction...
or may be affected by trade." Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora art II, Mar. 3, 1973,T.I.AS. No. 8249. The Convention on Nature
Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere related to the selection
and protection of certain animal reserves, such as national parks. Convention on Nature
Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Oct. 12, 1940, 50 Stat.
1354. The intended effect was to protect and preserve species of flora and fauna within
their natural habitats. Id. In addition to these treaties, the ESA lists other international
treaties to which the United States is to comply. The statute also states that the ESA is
intended to maintain United States compliance with: migratory bird treaties with Canada
and Mexico; the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty with Japan; the International
Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries; and the International Convention for
High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4)(A)-(G).
21. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 20 (citing Endangered Species Conserva-
tion Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275). The Endangered Species Conservation
Act was just one in a string of other environmental conservation statutes that led to the
Endangered Species Act. Id. ESCA was only in effect for four years before the ESA re-
placed it with more strict controls. See id.
22. Endangered Species Act (ESA), NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. FISHERIES
SERVICE, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/esa/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (citing Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006)). The original act was signed by President Richard Nixon, and
upon signing he stated that "[niothing is more priceless and more worthy of preservation
than the rich array of animal life with which our country has been blessed." Id.
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)-(c).Under those provisions, Congress specifically dictated the
purposes of the ESA as follows:
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to pro-
vide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened spe-
cies, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the
treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Policy
(1) It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments
and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and
shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.
(2) It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall coop-
erate with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert with
conservation of endangered species.
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this goal, the ESA takes a comprehensive approach to the protec-
tion of organisms and ecosystems.24 The statute uses a number of
different methods to protect "listed species."25 A listed species is
classified as either "endangered"26 or "threatened,"27 and classifica-
tion brings with it the protections of the act.2" This includes pro-
tection of the species itself from unlawful takings, protection of
designated critical habitats, implementation of recovery plans,
and special consultation requirements for certain activities.29 Vio-
24. Id. at 9§ 1531-44. According to the Supreme Court of the United States, the En-
dangered Species Act is "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endan-
gered species ever enacted by any nation." Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180
(1978). The substantive provisions of the ESA are found in §§ 4, 7, and 9. Shannon Peter-
sen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative History of the Endan-
gered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 464 (1999). Section 4 provides for the determination of
which species are threatened or endangered. 16 U.S.C. § 1533. Section 7 dictates the re-
quirements for interagency cooperation. Id. at § 1536. Section 9 enumerates prohibited
acts. Id. at § 1538.
25. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533. A "listed species" is a species that has been designated either
threatened or endangered under the ESA. See id.at § 1533. Under § 4 of the ESA, Con-
gress gave the Secretary of the Interior the power to promulgate regulations making the
determination as to "whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened species."
Id. at § 1533(a)(1). In so doing, the Secretary could take into account "(A) the present or
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutiliza-
tion for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or preda-
tion; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or man-
made factors affecting its continued existence." Id. at §1533(a)(1)(A)-(E). Listing decisions
must be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available" to
the Secretary. Id. at § 1533(b)(1)(A). The Secretary is not permitted to take into account
economic issues with regard to the determination of whether to classify a species as endan-
gered or threatened. PAMELA BALDWIN, EUGENE H. BUCK & M. LYNNE CORN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A PRIMER 6 (2007). The listing of a spe-
cies may be initiated by the Secretary, by a private organization, or by an individual by
petition. Id. Additionally, the Secretary must promulgate a regulation delineating the
'critical habitat" of a listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) ("The term 'endangered species' means any species which is in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species
of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection
under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to
man.").
27. Id. at § 1532(20) ("The term 'threatened species' means any species which is likely
to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a signifi-
cant portion of its range.").
28. Id. at §§ 1531-44. Once a species is listed, various provisions of the statute take
effect. Id. The Secretary is directed to classify the "critical habitat" of the species and to
create an appropriate recovery plan, and the species is protected from takings and has the
added protection of the required § 7(a)(2) consultation process. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note
25, at 7-8.
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. Of the most important protections is the prohibition of an
unlawful taking of a listed species. The term "take" under the statute means "to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any
such conduct." Id. at § 1532(19). The term "harass" is further defined by regulation as
"intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which
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lations of these provisions may result in civil or criminal penal-
ties.0 In addition to these protections, Congress also created un-
derlying policy mandates for federal governmental agencies.3
These mandates require federal agencies to "utilize their full au-
thority to conserve" protected species." The statute also requires
federal agencies to "consult" with the Department of the Interior
regarding proposed projects to ensure the protection of certain
ecosystems.33
include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006).
The same section defines harm as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife, which
may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or in-
jures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding or sheltering." Id. Additionally, the Secretary will designate certain areas "critical
habitats" for listed species, which is an area that is "essential for conservation" of the spe-
cies. Critical Habitat, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. FISHERIES SERVICE,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/criticalhabitat.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). This is
not limited to areas where the species currently lives. Id. Critical habitats are protected
under the ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1540. Civil penalties under the act can be as high as $25,000 per viola-
tion. Id. Under the Act's penalty provision:
Any person who knowingly violates, and any person engaged in business as an im-
porter or exporter of fish, wildlife, or plants who violates, any provision of this Act, or
any provision of any permit or certificate issued hereunder, or any regulation issued
in order to implement [the ESA] may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of
not more than $25,000 for each violation. Any person who knowingly violates, and
any person engaged in business as an importer or exporter of fish, wildlife, or plants
who violates, any provision of any other regulation issued under this Act may be as-
sessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more than $12,000 for each such viola-
tion. Any person who otherwise violates any provision of this Act, or any regulation,
permit, or certificate issued hereunder, may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secre-
tary of not more than $500 for each such violation.
Id. at § 1540(a)(1). In addition to these civil penalties, criminal charges may be brought for
some violations. Id. at § 1540(b)(1). Under the ESA, violators of the statute could be fined
up to $50,000 and could be imprisoned for up to a year. Id. Violations of regulations im-
plementing the ESA are punishable by fines of up to $25,000 and up to six months in
prison. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1).
31. John C. Beiers, The International Applicability of Section 7 of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171, 175 (1989) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)).
32. Id. Under that provision of the statute, Congress declares "that all Federal de-
partments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species
and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(c)(1).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). This sometimes controversial provision states that:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secre-
tary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (here-
inafter in this section referred to as an "agency action") is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by
the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical,
unless such agency has been granted an exemption for such action by the Committee
pursuant to subsection (h) of this section. In fulfilling the requirements of this para-
graph each agency shall use the best scientific and commercial data available.
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B. Section 7(a)(2)
Under § 7(a)(2) of the ESA, a federal agency proposing to take
some action ("Action Agency") is required to consult with the Sec-
retary of the Interior ("Secretary") whenever the proposed action
may impact an endangered or threatened species.34 During the
consultation, the Secretary will determine whether the proposed
action is "likely to jeopardize the continued existence"35 of a listed
species or if the action will "result in the destruction or adverse
modification of '36 a critical habitat.37 Specifically, § 7(a)(2) re-
quires that:
Each federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
(hereinafter in this section referred to as an "agency action")
is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any en-
dangered species or threatened species or result in the de-
struction or adverse modification of habitat of such species
Id. Two federal agencies are in control of implementing the ESA: the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), which "manages land and freshwater species, while the Na-
tional Marine Fishery Service ("NMFS") manages marine and 'anadromous' species." Id. at
§§ 1531-44. However, the enforcement of the ESA is "typically citizen-prompted and oppor-
tunistic." Plater, supra note 15, at 291. This enforcement is not necessarily efficient and
often focuses "on one small place, one discrete species or less, one tiny slice of the vast di-
versity of species that exist on the planet." Id. Due to the overlap in authority, there are
some differences in enforcement of the ESA; however, the services promulgate most regula-
tions jointly. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1991); Interagency Cooperation-Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (June 3, 1986). This is a jointly promulgated regu-
lation regarding § 7 consultations. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558
(1992).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2).
35. Id. Jeopardize is not defined in the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. The term is
defined in a regulation promulgated by the Services as "an action that reasonably would be
expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribu-
tion of that species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the requirement that the action reduce "the likelihood of both the
survival and recovery" as meaning a reduction in the likelihood of survival or recovery, due
to the statutory language of the ESA. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. USFWS, 378 F.3d
1059, 1059-71 (9th Cir. 2004).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Destruction or modification of critical habitat is not defined
in the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. The term is defined in a regulation as "direct or
indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the
survival and recovery of a listed species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02(2009). An area is a critical
habitat if the Secretary determines that the area is "essential for conservation" of the spe-
cies. Critical Habitat, supra note 29. This is not limited to areas where the species cur-
rently lives. Id.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
Fall 2012 Endangered Species Act 867
which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as
appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless such
agency has been granted an exemption for such action by the
Committee pursuant to subsection (h) of this section.
The statute does not qualify the consultation requirement . In-
stead, it simply mandates that an Action Agency shall consult if
such action will occur.4 ° If the Secretary determines that the ac-
tion would jeopardize the continued existence of a species or ad-
versely modify a critical habitat, the Secretary must offer reason-
able and prudent alternatives. 1 This provision is "an explicit con-
38. Id. In executing the mandates of this section, the agency in question is to "use the
best scientific and commercial data available." Id. In order to implement this mandate,
FSW and NMFS follow policy provisions specified in a federal regulation. Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy on Information
Standards Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34, 271 (July 1, 1994). That
regulations states that:
To assure the quality of the biological, ecological, and other information that is used
by the Services in their implementation of the Act, it is the policy of the Services:
a. To require biologists to evaluate all scientific and other information that will be
used to (a) determine the status of candidate species; (b) support listing actions; (c)
develop or implement recovery plans; (d) monitor species that have been removed
from the list of threatened and endangered species; (e) to prepare biological opinions,
incidental take statements, and biological assessments; and (f) issue scientific and in-
cidental take permits. This review will be conducted to ensure that any information
used by the Services to implement the Act is reliable, credible, and represents the
best scientific and commercial data available.
b. To gather and impartially evaluate biological, ecological, and other information
that disputes official positions, decisions, and actions proposed or taken by the Ser-
vices during their implementation of the Act.
c. To require biologists to document their evaluation of information that supports or
does not support a position being proposed as an official agency position on a status
review, listing action, recovery plan or action, interagency consultation, or permitting
action. These evaluations will rely on the best available comprehensive, technical in-
formation regarding the status and habitat requirements for a species throughout its
range ....
Id. See also Michael J. Brennan, David E. Roth, Murray D. Feldman & Andrew Robert
Greene, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Application of the "Best Scientific Data Available"
Standard in the Endangered Species Act, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387 (2003).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
40. Id. at § 1536 (a)(1).
41. Interagency Consultation (ESA Section 7), NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.
FISHERIES SERVICE, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/consultation/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit offered this explanation of the requirements of §
7(a)(2):
[T]he Act requires each federal agency to consult with the Secretary to "insure that
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or re-
sult in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species." After con-
sultation, the Secretary must issue a written opinion to the agency describing how
the proposed agency action would affect the endangered species or critical habitat.
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gressional decision to require [federal] agencies to afford first pri-
ority to the declared national policy of saving endangered spe-
cies."4
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") is an ad-
ministrative agency and must exercise its authority within its
statutory mandate. 3 If an agency exercises power beyond its
statutory authority, those actions are unconstitutional." At times,
agencies such as the FWS can exercise executive, legislative, and
judicial powers." This ability to exercise power triggers a need for
strict limits on agency power in order to respect the doctrine of
The Secretary must also suggest reasonable alternatives if the agency action would
jeopardize the existence of the species or habitat.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 118 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 504 U.S. 555 (1992))
(citations omitted).
42. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978). While Tennessee Valley Au-
thority concerned a previous version of the ESA, the provision in § 7(a)(2) is essentially the
same today. Steven. G. Davison, Federal Agency Action Subject to Section 7(a)(2) of the
Endangered Species Act, 14 Mo. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REV. 29, 33 (2006); see Act of Nov. 10,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752-60 (1978); Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93
Stat. 1225, 1226-28 (1979); Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 4, 96 Stat. 1411, 1417-2060 (1982). This
was acknowledged by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Marsh,
816 F.2d 1376, 1383 n.10 (9th Cir. 1987). There, the court of appeals stated that the
"amendments do not diminish the precedential force of the Supreme Court's decision in
TVA v. Hill." Id. The court in Sierra Club v. Marsh summarized the changes as follows:
The obligation of federal agencies now is to "insure that any action... is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species," and is found in §
7(a)(2). 93 Stat. at 1226, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
In the 1978 amendments, Congress prohibited agencies from making "any irreversi-
ble or irretrievable commitment of resources" during consultation "which has the ef-
fect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent
alternative measures." 92 Stat. at 3753, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). These
amendments also created a procedure whereby agencies could seek exemptions for
projects unable to conform with section 7(a)(2) and meeting several stringent criteria.
Id. at 3753-60, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p). We find it significant that Con-
gress gave the power to grant exemptions to the Endangered Species Committee, not
to the courts. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) & (g). The 1979 amendments sought to clarify
the exemption process. 93 Stat. at 1227-28; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 697, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2557, 2572,
2578-79. Congress again altered section 7 in 1982 in order to shorten and improve
the consultation process. 96 Stat. at 1417-20; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25-28, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2807, 2860,
2866-69.
Id. (citations omitted). After considering these changes, the court found that TVA v. Hill
had not been overruled by any of the amendments that followed the decision. Id.
43. See John Montana, Administrative Agencies and the Administrative Process,
RECORDS MGMT. Q., Apr. 1, 1997. Agencies must derive any power that they exercise from
governmental authorities. Id. Nothing in the constitution grants authority directly to
administrative agencies. Id. Therefore, "an agency may only exercise authority within the
delegation of authority provided for in its enabling legislation or subsequent legislation




separation of powers.46 Therefore, agencies are required to remain
true to the statutes that provide for their authority.47 Here, that
statute is the ESA, which gives the agency the power to promul-
gate regulations in order to enforce the ESA.4 8 Any action of the
FWS under the ESA that is contrary to or beyond the scope of the
ESA is invalid."9
The original regulation promulgated by the FWS and the Na-
tional Marine Fishery Service ("NMFS") (collectively referred to as
the "Services") in 1978 required that the § 7(a)(2) consultation
process be utilized for federal agency actions overseas."0 A year
later, the Secretary of the Interior began to rethink the decision to
include overseas actions." In 1986, the Services revised the regu-
lation to eliminate the requirement of the consultations for over-
seas activities, and the regulation specifically states:
Section 7(a)(2) of the Act requires every Federal agency, in
consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, to
insure that any action it authorizes, funds, or carries out, in
the United States or upon the high seas, is not likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of any listed species or results
52in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.
Following the provisions of this statute, the Services do not re-
quire §7(a)(2) consultations for overseas activities, and thus, the
ESA has no practical effect on such activities.53 This has remained
46. Id. An agency will often litigate issues as to whether it has exceeded the scope of
the power given to the agency. Id. This is often a lawsuit between the agency as regulator
and the parties being regulated by the agency. Id. In Lujan, plaintiffs were arguing that
FWS exceeded its statutory mandate by promulgating a rule that did not extend § 7 consul-
tations to overseas actions. See 504 U.S. at 587-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47. Montana, supra note 43.
48. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531-44.
49. Montana, supra note 43.
50. Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, 50 C.F.R. § 402.04
(1978); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992).
51. Lujan, 504 U.S. at558.
52. Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926
(June 3, 1986); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01.
53. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Serv., to the
Reg'l Dir., Lower Colo. Region, Bureau of Reclamation, (Jan. 11, 2005) (available at
http://nctc.fws.gov/EC/Resources/dev-ba/legal/all-american-canal-%20fws-memo.pdf).
This document regarded a "request for guidance on the most appropriate process to address
concerns regarding potential effects of the Canal Lining Project in the Republic of Mexico..
.. " Id.
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the position of the Department of the Interior ever since the Ser-
vices promulgated that regulation.
54
C. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
In Lujan, the Defenders of Wildlife55 litigated the application of
the requirements of §7(a)(2) to international projects in the federal
court system.56 At the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the De-
fenders of Wildlife prevailed.57 The court applied the Presumption
against extraterritorial application, but was convinced that "the
words of the Act and .. .its legislative history . . . [shows] that
Congress intended for the consultation obligation to extend to all
agency actions affecting endangered species, whether within the
United States or abroad." 8 Thus, the Defenders of Wildlife were
able to rebut the Presumption at that level. 9 However, at the
United States Supreme Court, the Secretary successfully argued
that the Defenders of Wildlife lacked standing to bring the claim."
54. Id. According to the FWS, "neither section 7 of the ESAU nor the section 7 consul-
tation and analysis process under the ESA's implementing regulations addresses species
outside the borders of the United States." Id.
55. "Defenders of Wildlife is an organization dedicated to the protection of species and
the habitats upon which they depend." Our History, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE,
http://www.defenders.org/about-us/history/index.php?utmsource=BVersionNoFlash&ut
m medium=TopNav&utm-content=AUHistory&utm campaign=HP_AB_Round2 (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012).
56. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555; Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 504 U.S. 555. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the § 7(a)(2)
issue, because it found that the Plaintiffs' lacked standing to bring the action. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 555. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, reached the merits of
the case and found that the regulation promulgated by the Secretary was unlawful. Lujan,
911 F.2d at 125. While this left open the possibility for future litigation regarding the
regulation, none has been forthcoming. The application of the regulation, which limits the
scope of the requirement under § 7(a)(2) for interagency consultations to domestic projects,
remains in effect. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1986); Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (June 3, 1986).
57. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 125. The court of appeals had previously reversed the district
court's dismissal of the action. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1036-37 (8th
Cir. 1988), rev'g 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1988). After remand, the District Court found
in favor of the plaintiffs, and the Eighth Circuit later affirmed. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 125.
The crux of the appeal by the Department of the Interior was that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and that Congress did not intend for § 7(a)(2) to apply to projects in foreign coun-
tries. Id. at 118. In a change of policy, the Secretary had limited § 7(a)(2)'s impact by
promulgating a regulation that limited the consultation requirement to projects "in the
United States or upon the high seas." 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1986). The previous regulation
had required consultations even in the case of projects in foreign countries. See 50 C.F.R. §
402.04 (1978).
58. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 125.
59. Id. (citation omitted).
60. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
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Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme
Court,' but did not reach the merits regarding the question of
whether§ 7(a)(2) consultations are required for overseas activities
by federal agencies.62 Instead, the Court found that, under the
facts of this case, the Defenders of Wildlife lacked the standing
necessary to sue.63 In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction,
a plaintiff must meet the requirements of standing, which include
a concrete injury, which was caused by the action complained of,
and a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the prob-
lem.64 In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the De-
fenders of Wildlife failed to show a concrete injury.5 A majority of
the Court agreed that the Defenders of Wildlife would not suffer a
concrete injury if the § 7(a)(2) consultations did not take place and
the overseas project continued, even though the project may harm
listed species.' The Court argued that since the project was hap-
pening far away from the Defenders of Wildlife, they would not be
directly impacted.
Only a plurality decided that the case lacked the requisite po-
tential for redressability" The plurality noted that a district
court would not have the authority to stop funding for the project
under these circumstances, and even if it did, the project was an
international cooperative project and would go on with or without
American support." Therefore, even if the Court forced a § 7(a)(2)
61. Id. at 557-78.
62. Id. at 558.
63. Id. at 578.
64. Id. at 560-61 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-42 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
508 (1975)).
65. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. The plaintiffs in Lujan claimed that the lack of any consul-
tation with regard to the proposed activity would cause an increase to "the rate of extinc-
tion of endangered and threatened species." Id. at 562 (citation omitted). The Court high-
lighted that "the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic pur-
poses," would qualify as an injury. Id. at 562-63. However, the Court felt that the Plain-
tiffs in Lujan failed to show that they themselves were injured. Id. at 563. Here, the plain-
tiffs argued that it was enough that they had traveled to the area in question to observe the
endangered animals and planned to again. Id. The Court felt that a mere desire to return
was not concrete enough to constitute an injury for standing purposes. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
564.
66. Id. at 562.
67. Id. at 562-67 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy deter-
mined that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but that the plaintiffs only lacked a concrete
injury. Id. (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 562-71. According to Justice Scalia, the Plaintiffs in Lujan failed to make
any showing that the projects in question would "either be suspended, or do less harm to
listed species, if" the United States withdrew its funding. Id. at 571. While the plaintiffs'
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consultation, and the federal agency was not allowed to continue
its action, other nations would finish the project, and the alleged
injury would still occur.7 O
In his concurring opinion, after finding that the Defenders of
Wildlife did have standing, Justice Stevens reached the merits of
the case.' Despite writing separately and disagreeing with the
majority's standing analysis, Justice Stevens agreed in the result,
because he determined that § 7(a)(2) consultations are not re-
quired for overseas actions by federal agencies.72 Justice Stevens
argued that Congress intended to limit § 7(a)(2) consultations to
domestic activities.73 This was predominately based on Justice
Stevens' application of the Presumption to § 7(a)(2) 74 and the fact
that the statute lacks the necessary reference to overseas activi-
ties to overcome the Presumption.5
In defense of his stance, Justice Stevens pointed out that there
are procedures for protecting endangered species living outside of
the United States.76 For example, § 8 of the ESA grants authority
to aid other nations in the protection of endangered species.77 Sec-
tion 9 of the ESA further incorporates international issues by
regulating the international trafficking of endangered species.78
Justice Stevens' final argument was that the ESA does not require
international application of § 7(a)(2), because the need to protect
ultimate goal is certainly the protection of species, this litigation regarded the consultation
process itself. Therefore, the fact that the project may have continued is not necessarily
determinative of the redressability issue. The plaintiffs were contesting a failure to consult
as required by § 7(a)(2). A positive outcome would have required that consultation. There-
fore, the plaintiffs would have gained what they sought and the problem would have been
redressed.
70. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571.
71. Id. at 581-82 (Stevens, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 585.
73. Id. at 585-86 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at586.
75. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens points out that the only
place that geography comes into this portion of the statute is with regard to adverse modifi-
cation of critical habitat. Id. The statute "mentions 'affected States'" in describing declara-
tion of critical habitat. Id. Beyond the language of the statute, courts should look to the
legislative history and the administrative regulations in order to determine Congressional
intent. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 287-90 (1949); Randall S. Abate,
Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A
Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of Context, 31
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 91 (2006).
76. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 588 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 8, 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a) (2006).
78. Id. at § 1538(a)(1)(A), (E), (F).
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endangered species within the United States is one of the enumer-
ated purposes of the Act. 9
Justice Blackmun authored his own opinion in dissent, dis-
agreeing with the Court with regard to standing, but without
reaching the merits." Even without analyzing the merits, Justice
Blackmun impliedly distanced himself from Justice Stevens' con-
currence.8' The underlying theme of Justice Blackmun's opinion is
that the Court is dealing a large blow to standing in environ-
mental cases that will have a detrimental effect on jurisprudence
in that area of the law.
82
The issue of standing was the major hurdle that the Defenders
of Wildlife could not overcome in Lujan."3 By focusing on the issue
of standing and not on the merits, the Court left open the question
of whether § 7(a)(2) applied to international actions by federal
agencies."' Considering the implication that a plaintiff with con-
crete plans to visit the region would have standing, 5 in his concur-
rence, Justice Kennedy noted that there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that standing could exist in a case where the plaintiffs had
such specific plans.86
D. The Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of
American Statutes
A major hurdle for any piece of environmental legislation that
may have an international impact is the Presumption against ex-
79. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 588 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens argued that the
lack of mention of protecting such species overseas indicates that Congress did not intend
to include international actions. Id.
80. Id. at 590-606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argues that this case
was not an appropriate case for granting summary judgment with regard to standing. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 606 (citation omitted).
83. Id.
84. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606.
85. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. Id. Lujan was decided nearly twenty years ago. Id. at 555 (majority opinion). As of
the beginning of 2012, there have been no successful challenges to the current regulation
which limits § 7(a)(2) of the ESA (requiring consultation with the Secretary for projects
taken place in the United States or upon the high seas), which is codified, in relevant part,
at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2) (2006). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has yet to have an oppor-
tunity to review the merits of such a claim. Since that time, the Presumption, as argued by
the Secretary and relied upon by Justice Stevens, has developed further. See, e.g., Morri-
son v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). These developments have increased
the likelihood that the Court would find the Presumption inapplicable with regard to the
requirement of consultations for projects taking place in the United States or on the high
seas pursuant to § 7(a)(2) of the ESA.
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traterritorial application of Congressional acts. In Lujan, the Sec-
retary of the Interior gave great weight to the Presumption in his
argument against the application of § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 to overseas projects.s7 Under this canon of
construction, any act of Congress is presumed to apply only to do-
mestic affairs absent a contrary intent of Congress.8" The underly-
ing policy is to prevent American laws from conflicting with the
laws of sovereign nations within their own territories."
Once it is determined that the Presumption applies, the burden
is on the moving party9 to demonstrate a "clear expression of
Congress" in favor of the proposed extraterritorial application of
the American statute.9' In determining whether a clear expression
or intent of Congress exists, a court is not "limited to the text of
the statue itself. To the contrary, [a court is] permitted to con-
sider 'all available evidence' about the meaning of the statute, in-
cluding its text, structure, and legislative history."92 An easily
overlooked, yet critical step of the analysis is to decide whether
application of the Presumption is in fact appropriate." This re-
quires judicial determination of whether a dispute is domestic or
international. 4 If the Presumption is applicable, courts are to
consider the language of the statute, the legislative history of the
statute, and the administrative regulations regarding the statute
to determine if Congress intended the statute to be applied extra-
territorially. 95
87. Brief for the Petitioner at 15, Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (No. 90-1424) (citations omitted).
88. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 512 n.8 (2006). The Supreme Court stated that it will "assume that
Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Therefore, unless there is 'the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed,' we
must presume it 'is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.'" Id. (citations omitted).
89. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21
(1963); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1949) (holding that American
employment laws do not apply abroad).
90. Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 968 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted).
91. See United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 966, 1003 (5th Cir. 1997).
92. United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211-12 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sale v. Hai-
tian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993)); see also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S.
197, 201-03 (1993).
93. See Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of
American Law, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 655, 661 (2011).
94. Id.
95. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 287-90 (1949). In Foley Brothers, the
Court listed administrative regulations as a consideration; however, there was no mention
of why executive actions would be an indication of congressional intent. Id. at 288.
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The Presumption has a long history in American jurispru-
dence." The Supreme Court first discussed the Presumption in
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy in 1804."7 Since then, the
Presumption has been reaffirmed and reshaped.98 Following a pe-
riod of consistent application, the strict application of the Pre-
sumption began to yield in the twentieth century.99
The federal courts have avoided the application of the Presump-
tion through a variety of analytical frameworks. °° The courts
have become less likely to apply the Presumption in instances
where the conduct complained of has some impact on the United
States.'0 ' Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals summarized this trend in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, stating that "it is settled law.., that any [country] may
impose liabilities... for conduct outside its borders that has con-
sequences within its borders which the [country] reprehends ...
."..Following this theory, courts have avoided application of the
Presumption when the conduct regulated has some impact that
occurs within the United States.' 3 In Environmental Defense
Fund v. Massey, the mere fact that the decision-making process
leading up to the execution of the project took place in the United
States was enough to avoid the Presumption.
0 4
96. Abate, supra note 75, at 91.
97. 6 U.S. 64 (1804). In that case, the ship in question was traveling between nations
when it was captured by a French privateer. Id. at 64. The ship was then recaptured by an
American vessel. Id. The vessel was brought back to the United States for a violation of
U.S. law that "prohibit[ed] all intercourse between the United States and France .... " Id.
at 116. The Court held that U.S. law should not be construed to violate laws of other coun-
tries when other possible constructions are available. Id. at 118.
98. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,344 U.S. 280, 281-83 (1952) (regarding applica-
tion of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act to an American businessman who was in violation of
the law through his operations in Mexico); Foley Bros.,336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (regarding
application of the United States' eight hours per day labor law to a U.S. corporation acting
abroad).
99. See Abate, supra note 75, at 93.
100. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted).
101. See Steele, 344 U.S. at 286; United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276
(1927) (holding that the Sherman Act could be applied to actions carried out abroad when
there was a conspiracy between U.S. citizens that was formed within the United States);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd en banc on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (citations omitted).
102. 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (citing Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620-21
(1927); Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1916); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S.
280, 284, 285 (1911); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1934)).
103. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
104. Id. at 532.
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The courts have also applied a continuum analysis while trying
to determine whether to apply the Presumption.' 5 Under this
framework, "the closer the United States is to completely control-
ling the place of conduct, the more likely the federal courts are to
apply U.S. Law."' In Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals used the continuum
analysis and declined to apply the Presumption in a case where
the project was taking place in Antarctica, a continent where the
United States has some control. 7 These frameworks weaken the
legal arguments of those who propose applying the Presumption to
§ 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. The complexity of
determining whether or not an action is indeed extraterritorial in
nature has not been lost on the Supreme Court.10 8 Recently, in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court
made clear that an action might be domestic in nature even if it
reaches beyond the U.S. borders09
E. Rasul v. Bush
Over the past decade the Supreme Court has heard a string of
cases relating to the detention of enemy combatants in Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba."0 While the situation that gave rise to those
cases was new to American courts, the underlying tenants of law
that the Court applied resonate in a variety of legal areas."' Ra-
sul v. Bush was no excepon,' which presented a narrow but cru-
105. See Abate, supra note 75.
106. Paul Boudreaux, Biodiversity and a New "Best Case" for Applying the Environ-
mental Statutes Extraterritorially, 37 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1121-22 (2007) (internal citations
omitted).
107. Id. (citing, inter alia, Massey, 986 F.2d at 533) (citations omitted).
108. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
109. See id. at 2869 (citations omitted).
110. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2008) (holding that the Mili-
tary Commissions Act violated the Constitution of the United States by denying detainees
the right of habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 626 (2006) (holding that
military commissions in their form at the time lacked the power under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and the Geneva Convention to try detainees); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
483 (2004) (holding that U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction to hear any petition for a writ
of habeas corpus brought by Guantanamo Bay detainees).
111. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466; Massey, 986 F.2d at 528.
112. The Rasul Court cited cases as deep into history as Ex Parte Milligan. Rasul, 542
U.S. at 474-75 (citing Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)). Further, the analysis of the
Court regarding the presumption against extraterritorial application of American statutes
is consistent with the developing history of the Presumption. See id. at 480 (citing Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))
Vol. 50876
Fall 2012 Endangered Species Act
cial question regarding the rights of detainees. ' The Court de-
cided that American courts had jurisdiction to hear petitions for
habeas corpus challenging the detention of foreign nationals who
were captured and detained outside of the United States as part of
military operations.1 '4 In so doing, the doors of the federal court-
houses were opened to detainees."5 Further, the Court's reasoning
buttressed a line of argument regarding the international applica-
tion of certain statutory provisions, including § 7(a)(2) of the
ESA-namely, the domestic nature of some actions that seem to
be extraterritorial upon initial examination. '
The Court's legal analysis begins with 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) and
(c)(3) which state that federal courts have "'within their respective
jurisdictions,' the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus
by any person who claims to be held 'in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.""'7 The writ
of habeas corpus has a history that stretches well beyond its
statutory implementation;"8 however, the continuing changes to
the statute and its interpretation have broadened the rights of
individuals seeking the writ. 119 The Court took great time to ex-
plain the history and development of the writ of habeas corpus
while reaching a solution to a modern question. 1
20
113. Id. at 470.
114. Id. at 470-71, 484-85. The Supreme Court identified the issue as "whether the
habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of Executive detention of
aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdic-
tion, but not 'ultimate sovereignty.'" Id. at 475.
115. The Court did not weigh in on the likely outcome of such a habeas proceeding.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
116. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
117. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2006)).
118. Justice Jackson has characterized the history as follows:
Executive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and lawless since John, at
Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed,
or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. The judges of
England developed the writ of habeas corpus largely to preserve these immunities
from executive restraint.
Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
This history has developed a great deal over the centuries. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474.
119. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1977). "The habeas statute clearly has
expanded habeas corpus 'beyond the limits that obtained during the 17th and 18th centu-
ries.'" Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474 (quoting Swain, 430 U.S. at 380, n.13 (1977)).
120. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473 (citations omitted). Currently, the writ of habeas corpus is a
statutory right. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (granting the right of habeas corpus relief to any
person who is held "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States"). The history of the statute itself dates back to 1789. Rasul,542 U.S. at 473.
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus to
petitioners who are "in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or
are committed for trial before some court of the same." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1
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The Court also analyzed case law, most notably Johnson v. Eis-
entrager."2  In Eisentrager, the Court found that U.S. courts
lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to German citi-
zens who were apprehended by the U.S. military in China and
were subsequently convicted of war crimes.'22 The Rasul court
distinguished Eisentrager based upon a number of factual differ-
ences. 123 The Court pointed out that in Rasul the individuals
seeking writs were:
[Niot nationals of countries at war with the United States,
and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of ag-
gression against the United States; they have never been af-
forded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and
convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they
have been imprisoned in territory over which the United
States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.'24
Stat. 73; see Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473 (citation omitted). Congress broadened the reach of the
writ of habeas corpus in 1867. Rasul,542 U.S. at 473. The writ then applied to "all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or
of any treaty or law of the United States." Id. (quoting the Judiciary Act of 1867-Act of
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1996)).
This statutory lineage, however, is only a portion of the history of the writ. Id. "Habeas
corpus is... 'a writ antecedent to statute,... throwing its root deep into the genius of our
common law."' Id. (citing Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945)). The heritage of
the writ began in English law centuries ago, and it "became 'an integral part of our com-
mon-law heritage' by the time the Colonies achieved independence," where it was recog-
nized in the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 473-74 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973)); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (prohibiting the suspension of"[tlhe
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus .. .unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."). The writ has continued to evolve "beyond the limits
that obtained during the 17th and 18th centuries." Swain, 430 U.S. at 380 n.13.
121. 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466 (citation omitted).
122. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765-68, 790-91. The Court in Eisentrager found certain
facts to be critical to its decision to decline to extend habeas corpus rights to the detainees.
Id. Those factors included whether the prisoner:
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was cap-
tured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war;
(d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United
States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f)
and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76.
123. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476. The Rasul Court distinguished Eisentrager, noting that
"nlot only are petitioners differently situated from the Eisentrager detainees, but the Court
in Eisentrager made quite clear that all six of the facts critical to its disposition were rele-
vant only to the question of the prisoners' constitutional entitlement to habeas corpus." Id.
(citations omitted).
124. Id.
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The Court pointed out that the Presumption has less impact on
this particular scenario, using the United States' exercise of "com-
plete jurisdiction and control" over Guantanamo Bay as a way to
differentiate Rasul from Eisentrager. While this somewhat
blunts the effect of the parallel reasoning in Rasulas would be ap-
plied to § 7(a)(2), the impact on the application of the Presumption
is still significant.
III. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE PRESUMPTION TO § 7(a)(2)
CONSULTATIONS
A. Continuum Analysis
While the Presumption against the extraterritorial application
of U.S. statutes has had a long history in American jurisprudence,
courts have often avoided the effect of the Presumption.1" Some of
these cases represent instances where the court applied the Pre-
sumption and found adequate congressional intent for the extra-
territorial application of the statute; however, courts have also
found that certain circumstances that seem extraterritorial in na-
ture are in fact domestic, and therefore, the Presumption is inap-
plicable.12'
125. Id. at 480 (citation omitted). This hedging is similar to that in Envtl. Def. Fund,
Inc., v. Massey, where the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
Presumption did not apply to the National Environmental Policy Act's ("NEPA") require-
ment of preparing environmental impact statements for projects in Antarctica. 986 F.2d
528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993). There, the court found that the presumption did not apply, or
applied with minimal strength, for two reasons. Id. at 531-32. First, because the prepara-
tion of an environmental impact statement is a domestic decision-making issue, and sec-
ond, because the project was taking place in Antarctica where the United States exercised
some control. Id.
126. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1115. See Hartford Fire Ins. v. California,509 U.S.
764, 814-15 (1993) (stating that the Presumption does not apply to antitrust actions); Steele
v. Bulova Watch Co.,344 U.S. 280, 285-89 (1952) (finding that the Presumption did not
apply to the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, as applied to prosecute a producer of counterfeit
watches in Mexico); Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 536-37 (finding that the National Environmental
Policy Act required the National Science Foundation to prepare an environmental impact
statement for projects in Antarctica) (citation omitted). See also John H. Knox, The Unpre-
dictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40Sw. L. REV. 635 (2011). The application
of the Presumption has been inconsistent. John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extra-
jurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INVL L. 351, 389 (2010).
127. See Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1118-24 (citations omitted); Massey, 986 F.2d
528, 536-37(holding that the regulation of the decision-making process which takes place in
the United States is not extraterritorial, despite the fact that a project being considered
would be completed overseas). In Massey, the court found that the requirement of prepar-
ing an Environmental Impact Statement applied to overseas projects. Id. This decision was
based on the conclusion that, because the preparation of the statement was part of the
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Courts have used different avenues to avoid applying the Pre-
sumption.118Professor Boudreaux,"2' in his article entitled Biodiver-
sity and a New "Best Case" for Applying the Environmental Stat-
utes Extraterritorially, analyzed the federal courts' decisions on
the matter.' Initially, he found that courts are more likely to
avoid applying the Presumption when there is what he termed a
"factual 'spillover.'"'' This regards the domestic impact of extra-
territorial events.'32 In addition to spillover, Professor Boudreaux
found that where "the potentially regulated conduct, although re-
lated to substantive action within another country, occurs, at least
in part, within the United States," courts are more likely to avoid
applying the Presumption. 133
In addition to these categories of cases, a broader continuum
analysis has emerged. 34 Under this structure, if the United States
has total control of the area where the conduct occurs, there is a
higher probability that a federal court will apply U.S. law. 135 This
continuum-based analysis was recognized in Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Massy, where the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals outlined "three
general categories of cases for which the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of statutes clearly does not apply."
136
Those categories are: (1) where Congress has clearly expressed its
decision-making process, and that process takes place within the United States, the Pre-
sumption did not apply. Id.
128. Boudreaux, supra note 106, 1115-25 (internal citations omitted).
129. Professor Paul Boudreaux is a Professor of Law at Stetson University College of
Law, teaching classes in Environmental Law, Legislation, Land-Use Planning, Real Prop-
erty, and a Natural Resources Law Seminar. Profile of Paul Boudreaux, STETSON UNIV.,
http://www.law.stetson.edu/faculty/boudreaux-paul/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
130. Bourdreaux, supra note 106, at 1115-25.
131. Id. at 1116. This was the case in the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Steele, where the Court gave significant weight to the fact that the counterfeit products
that were the subject of the litigation were being found within the United States. 344 U.S.
at 289.The Court found support for this conclusion in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927). The Court in that case underscored the importance of permitting
legislation to exist that would curb activities abroad which may bring "about forbidden
results within the United States." Id.
132. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1116.
133. Id. at 1118 (emphasis added).
134. See generally Abate, supra note 75.
135. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1122. This type of analysis appears throughout the
jurisprudence regarding the Presumption. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-
81(2004) (analyzing the presumption with regard to the United States controlled area of
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc., v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530-32 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (finding that the analysis regarding the Presumption is different in the "global com-
mons" area which is Antarctica) (citations omitted).
136. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
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intention that the statute apply extraterritorially; (2) where appli-
cation of the Presumption will adversely affect the United States;
and (3) where the action regulated occurs within the United
States' 37In addition, the Court pointed out that there are areas of
the world where the Presumption applies with less force. 138 These
are places where the United States exercises some degree of con-
trol. 1 39 The more control the United States exercises, the weaker
the Presumption becomes. 4 °
Professor Boudreaux applied this continuum structure to social
issues regarding clashes between the policies of the United States
and those of a nation in which a U.S. law may be applied."' Under
this framework, "[ilf applying law extraterritorially would insinu-
ate American social standards into a foreign society, the more
likely it is that there would be a direct clash of cultures, and the
more sensible it is to apply the Presumption.""" This analysis rec-
onciles two similar yet conflicting cases.4 3 In EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., ("Aramco"), the Supreme Court held that a U.S. citi-
zen was not entitled to protection under American labor laws
while working for an overseas branch of a company that also oper-
ates within the United States. 4 In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,
the Court found that the Lanham Act applied to the actions of
American citizens abroad.
45
While both of these cases dealt with the regulation of the con-
duct of American people or enterprises, the difference was the cul-
tural impact of enforcing the statutes abroad. In Aramco, the
137. Id. (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 533 (citations omitted).
139. Id. (regarding Antarctica). See also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81 (regarding Guan-
tanamo Bay).
140. See Abate, supra note 75, 103 (citing Massey, 986 F.2d at 533). The geographic
continuum has '[at] one end.., the United States, and at the other end ... sovereign for-
eign territories." Id. at 104. The grey area of the continuum includes areas like Antarctica
where "the U.S. has some measure of legislative control." Id. These areas are considered
"'global commons' areas." Id. (quoting Massey, 986 F.2d at 533). However, the continuum
analysis would also be applicable to areas where the United States exercises control, even
though it does not rise to the level of a global common area.
141. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1123.
142. Id.
143. Compare Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), with EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 512 n.8
(2006).
144. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246-47.
145. Steele, 344 U.S. at 285-89. Unlike in Aramco, the Court in Steele determined that
the Presumption did not apply. See id. Interestingly, Steele dealt with a similar situation
in which an American business was acting abroad. Id.; Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246-47.
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plaintiff was a U.S. citizen who was employed at an overseas op-
eration of Aramco, 45 the defendant corporation.'47 The plaintiff
brought suit against Aramco under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.148
Considering the fact that the company likely employed local work-"1 149
ers at that same facility, imposing a requirement that the com-
pany follow U.S. labor laws that stem from "American standards• 151
of ethnic and religious tolerance""' could easily create tension.
However, in Steele, that conflict would not have emerged. The
trademark laws in question were being applied only to an Ameri-
can citizen who resided within the United States.'52 The court im-
plied that there was no imposition of American values on a foreign
country, and there was no risk that certain employees would be
treated differently based on whether they were under the um-
brella of American law.
53
With regard to § 7(a)(2), this analysis leads to a conclusion that
the presumption should not apply.' The effect of § 7(a)(2) is to
create an obligation on federal agencies to consult with FWS or
NMFS, and the consultation is part of a deliberation process in
146. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 247. Aramco was a Delaware company which had business
operations worldwide. Id. This included subsidiaries in Texas, where the company was
licensed to do business. Id.
147. Id. Aramco employed the petitioner, who was an American citizen born in Leba-
non. Id. The petitioner worked for the company within the United States, but was later
transferred to Saudi Arabia at his own request. Id. He was discharged from the company
while he was working abroad. Id. As a result, the plaintiff filed a claim against Aramco
with the EEOC, claiming that his discharge was the result of discrimination. Aramco, 499
U.S. at 247. His cause of action came to federal court where the litigation continued to the
Supreme Court. Id.
148. Id.
149. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1123.
150. Id. (citations omitted).
151. Id. (citation omitted). The implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 derives
from the values of the Civil Rights movement in the United States. Eric Ledger, Relevance
is Irrelevant: A Plain Meaning Approach to Title VII Retaliation Claims, 44 AKRON L. REV.
583, 591-92 (2011) (citations omitted). The legislation brought the force of law to protect
equality even within private ventures. See id.
152. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952) (internal citation omitted).
153. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1123 (citations omitted). This is in line with the
landmark Presumption case, Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). In that case,
a U.S. citizen was working for the defendant company in Iran. Filardo, 336 U.S. at 283.
The plaintiff argued for the application of American labor laws to his overseas employment.
Id. This "would have created a difference in employment standards among workers" within
the same facility in Iran. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1123. Under these circumstances,
there was a great potential for social conflicts as the United States attempted to impose its
own labor standards in another country. Id. Therefore, the finding that the labor laws
were unenforceable in this situation was appropriate.
154. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1124 (citation omitted).
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which the Action Agency engages prior to beginning a project. 55
While the outcome of that process may have an effect on another
country, the decision of whether to participate in a project must be
left to the discretion of the United States and its agencies. There
would not be a potential conflict created by differential treatment
of individuals or entities as there was in Aramco.
B. The Spillover Effect
As Professor Boudreaux points out, the continuum analysis
seems to indicate that the Presumption should not apply to §
7(a)(2).156  This is consistent with the analysis under other ap-
proaches that courts have taken regarding the Presumption. Un-
der the spillover analysis, U.S. courts are more likely to find that
the Presumption does not apply when the overseas action has
some tangible impact on the United States. 57 This framework is
best illustrated by the Steele case where the Supreme Court
avoided applying the Presumption to the Lanham Act.' The
Court held that the Presumption did not apply under the circum-
stances. 9 In Steele, the Defendant was a U.S. citizen living in
Texas .16 Defendant's company manufactured counterfeit Bulova
watches in Mexico, and because the watches were finding their
way into the American market, the Supreme Court found a large
enough impact on the United States to avoid the application of the
Presumption. 6'
As applied to § 7(a)(2) of the ESA, the "spillover" model would
favor the courts avoiding application of the Presumption. There
are many different examples of how international protection of
wildlife could impact the territorial United States. Most simply,
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1116.
158. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952). The Lanham Trade-Mark Act
prohibits:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant [from using] in commerce
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.
Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006). The Act provides for civil liability
for those that operated in contravention of the statute. Steele, 344 U. S. at 284 (citations
omitted).
159. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1115.
160. Steele, 344 U.S. at 281.
161. See id.
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an impact on migratory animals that inhabit both the United
States and foreign lands would affect the United States.'62 While
this is an important potential argument, its impact is dulled be-
cause it would not apply to all listed species. A more comprehen-
sive avenue of argument would be to consider the impact of global
biodiversity 6' on the territorial United States.
While even the term biodiversity itself has only recently been
developed,'64 its scientific importance is paramount.6 , The signifi-
cance of the natural ecosystem is vital not just for the purpose of
preserving cherished wildlife, but it is also imperative in terms of
protecting existing human civilization.'66 In recent years, the
162. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1134 (citations omitted). In certain scenarios, the
wellbeing of species within the United States may depend on the use of conservation meas-
ures abroad. For instance, migratory birds could be well protected within the United
States, but if they are subjected to harsh conditions in their summer roosts, the creatures
may still face extinction. Id. (citations omitted). This can be applied to more remote sce-
narios as well. For instance, if a species lives only in the United States, but its food supply
travels between nations, then the United States has an interest in protecting that food
supply despite the fact that the food supply may reside outside the territories of the United
States. Id. (citations omitted).
163. Biodiversity is "defined as the presence of a large number of species of animals and
plants." Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbit, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (1997). According to
the Babbit court:
The variety of plants and animals in this country are, in a sense, a natural resource
that commercial actors can use to produce marketable products. In the most narrow
view of economic value, endangered plants and animals are valuable as sources of
medicine and genes. Fifty percent of the most frequently prescribed medicines are de-
rived from wild plant and animal species. Such medicines were estimated in 1983 to
be worth over $15 billion a year. In addition, the genetic material of wild species of
plants and animals is inbred into domestic crops and animals to improve their com-
mercial value and productivity.
Id. at 1152-53 (citations omitted).
164. Biodiversity, IBN INST. FOR BIODIVERSITY,
http://www.biodiv.de/index.php?id=13&L=1 (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). The term was
created in 1986 at the "National Forum on Biodiversity" in the United States. Id.
165. See Dale D. Goble, What are Slugs Good For? Ecosystem Services and the Conserva-
tion of Biodiversity, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 411, 114n.7 (2006). Even the fruit fly "can
yield crucial clues to human development." Jennifer Ackerman, Journey to the Center of the
Egg, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at 45 (internal quotations omitted).
166. SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS OF THE ENVIRONMENT (SCOPE),
BIODtVERSITY CHANGE AND HUMAN HEALTH: FROM ECOSYSTEM SERVICES TO SPREAD OF
DISEASE 2 (Osvaldo E. Sala, Laura A. Meyerson & Camille Parmesan eds., 2009). In terms
of the health of human beings, ecosystems provide the basic elements of life, prevent the
transmission of disease, and provide platforms for medical research. Id. Furthermore:
At least 40 per cent of the world's economy and 80 per cent of the needs of the poor
are derived from biological resources. In addition, the richer the diversity of life, the
greater the opportunity for medical discoveries, economic development, and adaptive
responses to such new challenges as climate change.
Anup Shah, Why is Biodiversity Important? Who Cares?, GLOBAL ISSUES (July 20, 1998),
http://www.globalissues.org/article/170/why-is-biodiversity-important-who-cares (citing
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, available at
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complexity of ecosystems has become a vibrant area of study.
These studies have not only shown the fragility of ecosystems, but
also their interwoven nature."' Each piece of an ecosystem plays
a role that may be irreplaceable." Importantly, science has re-
cently begun to unravel the extent to which the ecosystems of the
world depend on one another. 9 Researchers are thereby showing
that seemingly isolated ecosystems have a global impact. 17  In ad-
dition to the biological issues, there are substantial economic
benefits to promoting biodiversity 1 7' Efforts to maintain biodiver-
sity and protect ecosystems abroad will have a positive impact on
the United States. These efforts are exactly the type of spillover
benefit that the Supreme Court found to be an overriding circum-
stance in Steele.
The protection of biodiversity would benefit the United States in
a number of ways. While the aesthetic and recreational pleasures
of living in a rich environment certainly benefit human beings,
biodiversity has a deeper impact on human life. 172  Biodiversity
impacts climate issues,'173 agriculture,'174 human health,'75 business,
and genetic research. 76 This is arguably a more significant "spill-
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-leaflet.asp). See also, CARLOS CORVALAN, SIMON
HALES & ANTHONY MCMICHAEL, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN
WELL BEING: HEALTH SYNTHESIS: A REPORT OF THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT
(Jos6 Sarukhdn et al. eds., 2005), available at
http://www.who.int/globalchangetecosystems/ecosys.pdf.
167. See Goble, supra note 165, at 412-13.
168. See Paul Ehrlich, The Loss of Diversity: Cause and Consequences, in BIODIVERSITY
21, 21(E.O. Wilson ed., 1988). "Each time a species becomes extinct, the pool of wild species
diminishes. This, in turn, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce by diminishing a
natural resource that could otherwise be used for present and future commercial purposes."
Babbit,130 F.3d at 1053.
169. See generally Michel Loreau & Andy Hector, Partitioning Selection and Comple-
mentarity in Biodiversity Experiments, 412 NATURE 72 (2001), available at
http://biology.mcgill.ca/faculty/loreau/pdfsfloreauhectornature.pdf.
170. See id.
171. Shah, supra note 166. The importance of protecting biodiversity has been noted by
at least one federal court. See Babbitt, 130 F.3d at 1052-53. Even "[al species whose worth
is still unmeasured has what economists call an "option value"-the value of the possibility
that a future discovery will make useful a species that is currently thought of as useless."
See id. at 1052-53 (citing Bryan Nolan, Commodity, Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of
Quantification in Valuing Biodiveristy, in BIODIVERSITY, supra note 168, at 200, 202).
172. See Goble, supra, note 165 at 412.
173. Costanza et al., supra note 10 at 255 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
174. See Parris, supra note 10.
175. See Chivian & Bernstein, supra note 10, at A-12.
176. See Pimentel et al., supra note 10, at 750. The benefit of preserving endangered
species is critical as "tourists travel to see them, scientists study and learn from them, and
people get aesthetic pleasure from them. In addition, every species offers some clues to the
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over" than the Supreme Court pointed out in Steele. There, it was
merely the appearance of counterfeit watches in the American
market that prompted the United States Supreme Court to refrain
from applying the Presumption.'77 With regard to the conservation
efforts implemented through § 7(a)(2), the beneficial results rise
beyond a merely commercial influence. Given these circum-
stances, the "spillover" model tends to weigh in favor of not apply-
ing the Presumption.
C. The Impact of Rasul
In Lujan, the Secretary of the Interior, in arguing for the appro-
priateness of the regulation limiting the application of § 7(a)(2) to
domestic projects, attributed great weight to the Presumption. 8
Under the Presumption, laws passed by the U.S. Congress will be
interpreted to apply "only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States."'79 Application of this particular canon of construc-
tion seems straightforward. In reality, recent developments in
this area of law have led to a reshaping of the judicial interpreta-
tion of the canon. 8' Previously, the burden would be on the party
attempting to show that the statute should be applied to extrater-
ritorial activities by showing the "clear expression" of Congress. 8'
However, that application of the Presumption presupposes that
the statute is, in fact, acting extraterritorially.
However, the Presumption should not apply where the statute
in question regulates the decision-making process of federal agen-
cies, because that process is wholly domestic. The District of Co-
path of the evolutionary chain that produced it and to the role of certain genes also found in
humans." Babbitt, 130 F.3d at 1052 n.il.
177. Steele, 344 U.S. at 281.
178. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 125 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 504 U.S.
555 (1992) (citation omitted). According to the circuit court, 'the Secretary relie[d] heavily
upon the canon of statutory construction that statutes are presumed to have domestic scope
only." Lujan, 911 F.2d at 125 (citation omitted).
179. Foley Bros. v. Filardo,336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (citation omitted). In Foley Broth-
ers, the Court noted that the underlying justification for this particular canon of construc-
tion lied with "the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic condi-
tions." Id. While this assumption may make sense in certain contexts, the canon itself is
an oversimplification of the Congressional thought process in its passage of sweeping legis-
lation. See id.
180. Brilmayer, supra note 93, at 661.
181. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 125. According to the Court, "Itlo overcome the presumption
that the statute was not intended to have extraterritorial application, there must be clear
expression of such congressional intent." Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d
996, 1003 (5th Cir. 1977)). Notably, the court of appeals in Lujan found such intent. 911
F.2d at 125.
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lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals has relied on this proposition in
avoiding the application of the Presumption, and that approach
has been advanced in the academic community.5"The Guan-
tanamo Bay detainee case, Rasul v. Bush, has become an unlikely
source of support for this reasoning.
In Massey, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals re-
lied upon the underlying principle of this argument.8 5 In Massey,
the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") brought an action to
compel the National Science Foundation ("NSF") to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), as required by the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").5 6 This procedure is
similar to the consultation procedure in § 7(a)(2). 187 The issue was
whether the requirement of preparing an EIS applied to the NSF's
actions in Antarctica. The argument raised by the NSF was that
the Presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. stat-
182. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc., v. Massey,986 F.2d 528, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
183. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1115.
184. 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (citations omitted).
185. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 530 (citations omitted). At issue in Massey was the Na-
tional Science Foundation's ("NSF") plans to incinerate food waste in Antarctica. Id. at 529
(citations omitted). The lower court found in favor of NSF on the grounds that the Pre-
sumption applied and that the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") was not able to make
a showing of clear congressional intent to rebut the Presumption. Id. at 530. NEPA re-
quires that:
[Elvery recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, [contain] a
detailed statement by the responsible official on-(i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the
relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the mainte-
nance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irre-
trievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1969). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C), with 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2)
(1973).
186. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 529. The NSF "is an independent federal agency created
by Congress in 1950 'to promote the progress of science; to advance the national health,
prosperity and welfare; [and] to secure the national defense." About the National Science
Foundation, NAT'L Sci. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/aboutl (last visited Jan. 22, 2012). The
EDF is an organization dedicated to the preservation of "the natural systems on which all
life depends." Our Mission and History, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, http://www.edf.org/about/our-
mission-and-history (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
187. The two requirements are similar in that they both pertain to the decision-making
process of the government and deal with a requirement that action agencies exercise fore-
thought prior to taking action that may impact wildlife. See 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2); 42
U.S.C. § 4332(C).
188. Massey, 986 F.2d at 530.
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utes applied and weighed in favor of this action's exclusion from
the normally required preparation of an EIS.' 9
The court found that the Presumption did not apply in this
situation.9 ' According to the court, "the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality is not applicable when the conduct regulated by
the government occurs within the United States."' 9' If there is no
regulation of conduct outside the United States, then there is no
issue as to the extraterritorial application of a statute.1 92  The
court applied this principle to the NEPA's requirement of prepar-
ing an EIS and found that because the "NEPA is designed to con-
trol the decision making process of U.S. federal agencies," the
statute only regulated domestic conduct. 9
The court reasoned that the EIS section of the statute bound
"only American officials and controls the very essence of the gov-
ernment function: decision making. ' ' Because that process takes
place almost exclusively within the United States, it is a domestic
matter.'9 ' Importantly, the NEPA did not dictate a certain sub-
stantive course of conduct on the part of a federal agency; it only
pertained to the decision-making process.' 96 Therefore, the statute
was exclusively domestic and the Presumption did not apply.'
97
189. See id. (citation omitted).
190. Id. at 532.
191. Id. at 531.
192. Id.
193. Massey, 986 F.2d at 532.
194. Id. See also Comment, NEPA's Role in Protecting the World Environment,131 U. PA.
L. REV. 353, 371 (1982) (citation omitted).
195. Massey, 986 F.2d at 532 (citation omitted). The court backed off from this holding
to a certain extent by indicating that the unique status of Antarctica as a global commons
area gave the court more leeway in avoiding the application of the statute. See id. at 533-
34. There had been previous cases where the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply to Antarctica for this
reason. See Beattie v. United States,756 F.2d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1984). A similar line of
reasoning applied in Rasul v. Bush, where the United States Supreme Court indicated that
the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply with great weight, because the
individuals in question were being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which was under the
exclusive control of the United States. 542 U.S. 466, 480-84 (2004).
196. Massey, 986 F.2d at 532 (citations omitted); see Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (citations omitted).
197. Massey, 986 F.2d at 537. This decision has been complicated by the Court's inclu-
sion in its opinion of a declaration that the Presumption applies with less force when the
project in question is taking place in a territory under the partial control of the United
States. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1119.
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Recently, the Supreme Court adopted a similar view in limiting
the applicability of the Presumption.198 In Morrison v. National
Australian Bank, 9  the Court noted a preliminary question in de-
termining whether the Presumption even applies is whether the
dispute before the Court is in fact extraterritorial in nature. °0
Under that framework, a court determines the true extraterritori-
ality by examining the "focus" of the dispute. 0 ' The term "focus" is
a recent development in the judicial application of the Presump-
tion."2 Therefore, the definition has yet to be solidified. However,
the term seems to refer to "the essence of the cause of action."203 If
the essence of the cause of action is within the United States, the
"focus" would be domestic and not extraterritorial.0 4 In such a
case, the Presumption would not apply.0 5
A similar line of reasoning applied in Rasul. The crucial aspect
of that case, as it relates to the international application of other
statutory provisions, is the Court's acknowledgement that "the
writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be
unlawful custody."2 6 This decision changed the perspective re-
garding the determination of whether jurisdiction exists in such
cases, because it refocused the attention of the Court onto the or-
ganizations of the United States that would clearly be under the
jurisdiction of the courts of this country.2 7 The Court dispensed
with the issue of the Presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of Congressional legislation by noting that Guantanamo Bay
is within the "territorial jurisdiction" of the United States.2 8 In
addition, the Court pointed out that the statute in question did not
differentiate between "Americans and aliens held in federal cus-
tody," and because of that, there is no "reason to think that Con-
198. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010). The decision
in this case was 8-0, and the majority opinion was authored by Justice Scalia. Morrison,
130 S. Ct. at 2875. Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the proceeding. Id. at 2875.
199. 130 S. Ct. at 2869.
200. Id. at 2884; Brilmayer, supra note 93, at 661.
201. Brilmayer, supra note 93, at 661.
202. Id. According to Brilmayer, "[tihe 'focus' that the majority refers to is a relative
newcomer to the jurisprudence of extraterritoriality." Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. Because the presumption would not apply, application of this principal would
prevent the necessity of trying to determine Congressional intent. Id.
206. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478 (2004) (quoting Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973)).
207. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
208. Id. at 480.
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gress intended the geographical coverage of the statute to vary
depending on the detainee's citizenship."2 9
Similarly, Congress would not have intended the effect of §
7(a)(2) on the decision-making process to vary depending on the
location of the project. As it is currently applied, § 7(a)(2) requires
federal agencies to consult with the Secretary regarding projects
that the agency is participating in within the United States."'
Projects that do not fall within the scope of § 7(a)(2), by virtue of
being located outside the United States, do not currently require
consultation.21' While the legality and propriety of this application
of the statute is questionable, the main argument of proponents of
the current regulation depends on the Presumption.212 Regardless
of whether the Presumption could be overcome in such a case, the
current state of the case law lends itself to the argument that the
application of the Presumption would be inappropriate in and of
itself.
With the decision in Rasul the Court determined that the focus
of a writ of habeas corpus is upon the jailer, not the jailed.21
Therefore, the application of the habeas corpus statute under
those circumstances is domestic, because the jailer, the U.S. gov-
ernment, is a domestic entity. Similarly, § 7(a)(2) controls the ac-
tions of federal agencies.24 These agencies doubtlessly fall under
the jurisdiction of Congress. Further, the agency actions, even
while engaging in international projects, are rooted within the
United States. While the execution of the project may be overseas,
the funding and organizational structure is within the United
States. This is similar to the jailers in Rasul. While the affected
party, the detainee, was overseas, the writ itself was directed at a
domestic party. Here, while the project may be overseas, the stat-
209. Id. at 468.
210. Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, 50 C.F.R. § 402.01
(2012).
211. Id.
212. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1991) (No.
90-1424).
213. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15. The Court stated that:
Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in
acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive deten-
tion for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdic-
tion and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being
charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006)). According to the Court "[n]o party questions the
District Court's jurisdiction over petitioner's custodians." Id.
214. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2) (2006).
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ute is directed at a domestic party.2"5 Therefore, the "focus" of an
action to enforce § 7(a)(2) consultations for extraterritorial projects
is domestic in nature. Under these circumstances, the Presump-
tion against extraterritorial application of a statute would not ap-
ply, because the action in question is a domestic one.
It is important to note that the analysis of the Supreme Court in
Rasul followed a similar pattern to the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' analysis in Massey, where, after making a
broad determination regarding the domestic nature of the dispute,
the court supported its argument by pointing out the implications
of the territorial status of the locations of the overseas aspects of
the issue."' While in Massey, it was the global commons argu-
ment regarding Antarctica , in Rasul it was the fact that the
United States had exclusive control over Guantanamo Bay.1 8
These arguments, while increasing the persuasiveness of the opin-
ions, are parallel to the domestic issue analysis, instead of being
interwoven. The inclusion of the additional support for the deci-
sions weakens the argument regarding the domestic issue analy-
sis. 29 Nonetheless, the case law is building in favor of avoiding
application of the Presumption to issues such as applying the re-
quirements of § 7(a)(2) to overseas projects.
The reasoning in Rasul and Morrison is in line with the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in Massey. The
strength of this argument has now been buttressed by the Court's
acknowledgement that some circumstances that seem interna-
tional in nature are, in fact, domestic for the purposes of the Pre-
sumption." This result is consistent with the underlying policy
concerns that gave rise to the Presumption.
215. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006).
216. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 533-34 (D.C. Cir 1993) (citations
omitted).
217. Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted).
218. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480 (2004).
219. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1119 ("The strength of the conclusion in EDF v.
Massey was dulled . . . by the fact that the court added an additional and alternative
ground for its holding."). Id. That alternative ground was the fact that Antarctica was a
global commons area over which the United States exercised some control. Massey, 986
F.2d at 533-34 (citations omitted). The Court stated that it had "not decided... how NEPA
might apply to actions in a case involving an actual foreign sovereign." Id. at 537 (citations
omitted). However, the reasoning underlying the domestic decision-making analysis still
adds credence to that argument for the inapplicability of the Presumption as applying to
the requirement of § 7(a)(2) consultations to overseas projects.
220. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-82 (citations omitted).
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IV. WHY AVOIDING APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION IS
APPROPRIATE
The Presumption is premised on the assumption that "Congress
1) hesitates to authorize the application of laws that conflict with
the laws of another sovereign, and 2) is 'primarily concerned with
domestic conditions."'221' Through the Presumption, the goal of
avoiding conflicts with foreign laws is effectuated. Given these
underlying reasons for the Presumption approach, it follows that if
the fears of conflicts with foreign laws is obviated, the necessity of
applying the Presumption weakens. 22 Likewise, in the event that
an action that seems extraterritorial is actually domestic, the ar-
gument for the Presumption grows even feebler.222
With regard to the avoidance of conflicts with foreign laws, the
application of § 7(a)(2) does not present much risk.224 The U.S.
government argued before the Supreme Court in Lujan that the
application of § 7(a)(2) to extraterritorial projects would create the
type of conflict that the courts have tried to avoid.22' However,
there is a small likelihood that such an issue would arise. As pre-
viously noted, the consultation process is part of an agency's deci-
22sion-making process. 26 It would be a great leap for the courts to
221. Anna D. Stasch, 2005 Ninth Circuit Environmental Review: Chapter: ARC Ecology
v. United States Department of the Air Force: Extending the Extraterritorial Reach of Do-
mestic Environmental Law, 36 ENVTL. L. 1065, 1067-68 (2006) (citations omitted). Even
from very early cases, the Supreme Court has striven to avoid conflicts between the laws of
the United States and the laws of foreign nations. See Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
64, 118 (1804). In Murray, the Supreme Court stated that "an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains ...."
Id. at 118. Additionally, case law has consistently held that the Supreme Court will inter-
pret legislation with the assumption that the primary concern of Congress is domestic. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
222. Boudreaux, supra note 106, at 1123.
223. Id.
224. Id. It is unclear from the case law revolving around the Presumption whether the
Supreme Court is particularly concerned with a direct conflict of laws or just the creation of
diplomatic or social conflict on a more basic level. Id.
225. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1991) (No.
90-1424). The petitioners argued that:
[Sleveral courts of appeals have pointed out, conditioning assistance to a foreign na-
tion on compliance with our own environmental standards "directs that nation's
choices just about as effectively as a law whose explicit purpose is to compel foreign
behavior," and would likely be seen by that nation as a "disguised way of substituting
United States regulatory standards for the [foreign nation's] own."
Id. at 46 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d
1345, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1981); accord United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002
(5thCir. 1977)).
226. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir 1993) (dealing
with NEPA) (citations omitted).
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consider placing limitations on the manner in which U.S. federal
agencies come to make policy decisions in order to prevent poten-
tial social conflicts with foreign nations.227
The conflicts contemplated by the Court in promulgating the
Presumption are not of concern regarding § 7(a)(2). Furthermore,
as previously argued, this line of reasoning also indicates that the
consultation process is actually domestic in nature. These circum-
stances show that the underlying concerns that created the Pre-
sumption are not an issue regarding consultations. Therefore, a
court's decision not to apply the Presumption would be in line with
the long history of jurisprudence in this area.228
V. CONCLUSION
The application of § 7(a)(2) consultation requirements to inter-
national projects has not been litigated since Lujan. However,
considering the current jurisprudence regarding the Presumption,
there is a good chance that a plaintiff with standing could easily
overcome this hurdle. While the court of appeals found that the
Presumption was overcome by indications of congressional intent,
recent decisions of federal courts have indicated that even initial
application of the Presumption may not be necessary in the case of
§ 7(a)(2) consultations. 9  Most notably, because § 7(a)(2) is di-
rected at the decision-making process of federal agencies, it is
therefore domestic in nature. This theory has been prominent in
circuit court decisions; however, the Supreme Court's decision in
Rasul may be an indication of the Court's willingness to accept
such an argument.230
227. Id. at 532 (citations omitted); see also Comment, supra note 194, at 371.
228. See Morrison v. Nat'l. Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804); Massey, 986
F.2d 528.
229. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; Massey, 986 F.2d 528; Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,
911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
230. See, e.g., Massey, 986 F.2d 528. See also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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